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Abstract
We employ a structural threshold regression methodology to investigate the heterogeneous
effects of debt on growth using public debt as a threshold variable as well as several other
plausible variables. Our methodology allows us to address parameter heterogeneity that
characterizes cross-country growth data and at the same time account for endogeneity. We
find strong evidence for threshold effects based on democracy, which implies that higher public
debt results in lower growth for countries in the Low-Democracy regime. Our results are
consistent with the presence of parameter heterogeneity in the cross-country growth process
due to fundamental determinants of economic growth proposed by the new growth theories.
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There is a growing concern that current debt trajectories in several economies around the
world are not sustainable implying risks to long-term growth and stability. For example, at
the end of 2011, Japan’s debt-to-GDP of 233% was the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among the
world’s developed countries. The US debt-to-GDP ratio reached 102% after the government’s
debt ceiling was lifted, and in Europe, the prime example is Greece with a 165.3% debt-to-
GDP ratio. The outlook for a number of countries does not look any better under existing
fiscal policies. As argued by Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011a) projections of debt-
to-GDP ratios look even worse, especially when one takes into account expected future
age-related spending.
All this evidence has created an urgent need for policymakers in governments, central
banks, and international policy organizations to understand the effects of public debt on
economic growth. The fear that investors may interpret the high debt-to-GDP ratios as the
result of time inconsistent or inflationary policies has led countries to implement immediate
and severe austerity measures on their citizens and adopt fiscal discipline in order to restore
their credibility irrespective of the costs in terms of high unemployment, deflation, and the
possibility of depression. But is this fear justified for all countries?
In fact, the concerns over the sustainability of public debt levels are grounded in both
theory and empirics; see for example Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for a comprehensive
survey of the existing literature.1 The theoretical literature has distinguished between the
positive short-run effects of accumulating public debt in order to enact counter-cyclical
policies and potential negative long-run growth effects from high levels of debt. For example,
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) emphasize the potential crowding out effect of higher public
debt on private investment although their back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the
growth effects from crowding out may be modest.
A key focus of the current literature on the effects of public debt on economic
performance has been the attempt to identify nonlinear and in particular threshold effects.
The idea is that debt levels that are above a particular threshold value may have different
implications for growth compared to more moderate levels of debt. There exists theoretical
work that suggests that the effect of public debt on growth may, in fact, be nonlinear so
that there may exist an optimal level of public debt; see Checherita-Westphal, Hallett, and
1The literature review portions of this paper draw heavily from their work.
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Rother (2012) and Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry, and Qureshi (2012). Using data for OECD
countries, Greiner (2011) finds that the optimal level of public debt ranges between 43% and
63% of GDP.
In terms of the empirical literature, a recent prominent study by Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010) found that there is generally a weak relationship between government debt and
economic growth for countries with debt below 90% of GDP. However, for countries with
debt-to-GDP over 90%, debt can have adverse consequences on growth. Other studies have
attempted to provide a formal test for the 90% threshold value of Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010). For example, Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011b) and Caner, Grennes, and
Koehler-Geib (2010) employ the threshold regression of Hansen (2000) to estimate public
debt thresholds. Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli (2011b) study the effects of public debt
on growth using a new dataset on debt levels in 18 OECD countries from 1980 to 2010. Using
threshold regression, they find that government debt is bad for growth when it is above the
threshold value of 85% of GDP. Caner, Grennes, and Koehler-Geib (2010) using threshold
regression methods on data for a larger set of countries for 1980 to 2008 find that a threshold
of 77% public debt-to-GDP ratio is the critical level after which debt becomes damaging to
growth. Relatedly, Minea and Parent (2012) employ the panel smooth threshold regression
model of González, Teräsvirta, and Van Dijk (2005) who find that there is a negative effect
of public debt on growth when the level of debt is between 90% and 115% of GDP.
Current work suffers from a number of conceptual and methodological issues. An
important limitation of the recent work has been the failure to adequately account for
heterogeneity in the effect of debt on growth, which may arise due to alternative growth
theories. Specifically, researchers have been searching for threshold effects of public debt on
growth when debt is above or below a particular public debt threshold value. The alternative
that has been considered is simply that there is no nonlinearity in the effect of public debt on
growth. However, these studies do not investigate other possible threshold variables beyond
the debt-to-GDP ratio. But, why would we believe a priori that the effect of public debt on
growth is characterized only by excessive levels of debt?
This paper is designed to elucidate our understanding by providing answers to the
above questions using an econometric methodology that allows us to deal with parameter
heterogeneity more generally. Parameter heterogeneity refers to the idea that the data
generating process that describes the cross-country growth process is not common for all
observations. For example, theory suggests that other factors besides just the debt-to-
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GDP ratio; e.g., a country’s trade openness or institutional quality, are plausible sources
of convergence clubs and therefore can be used as threshold variables to sort countries into
multiple growth regimes in which countries obey the same growth model.
One approach that deals with the problem of parameter heterogeneity is to use threshold
regression (TR) or sample splitting models. In a seminal paper, Durlauf and Johnson (1995)
employed a sample splitting (specifically, a regression tree) approach to uncover multiple
growth regimes in the data. Following a similar strategy Papageorgiou (2002) organized
countries into multiple growth regimes using the trade share and Tan (2010) classified
countries into development clubs using the average expropriation risk.2 A key goal of this
paper therefore is to evaluate the strongest evidence for a particular factor (be it the debt-
to-GDP ratio, institutions, etc) out of a large set of plausible candidates, in the context of
threshold regression models, as being the most plausible threshold variable to characterize
the heterogeneous effects of public debt on growth and thereby, consequently, organizing
countries into multiple growth regimes.
One difficulty with the recent work on the effects of public debt on growth is
that they largely ignore the problem of endogeneity in the threshold variable. This is
important because, as Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2013) argue, if the threshold variable
is endogenous, the above approaches will yield inconsistent parameter estimates for the
regime-specific partial effects. In fact, there is strong evidence that variables such as public
debt, trade, and institutions are endogenous; see Panizza and Presbitero (2012), Frankel and
Romer (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), respectively. In this paper,
we therefore model parameter heterogeneity using the structural threshold regression (STR)
model, which was proposed by Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2013). Threshold regression
models classify observations into stochastic processes depending on whether the observed
value of a threshold variable is above (or below) a threshold value. A key feature of STR is
that it allows for the endogeneity of the threshold variable as well as for the endogeneity of
regressors. Our analysis augments the Solow growth model with the debt-to-GDP ratio and
investigates the possibility of multiple growth regimes in the data using a comprehensive
set of growth determinants as threshold variables including among others the debt-to-GDP
ratio, institutions, ethnic fractionalization, and trade openness.
2An alternative approach employs semiparametric models based on nonparametric smooth functions to
identify general nonlinear growth patterns. Notable examples include Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin (2001)
and Mamuneas, Savvides, and Stengos (2006).
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In terms of our findings, we find strong evidence for threshold effects based on democracy,
as a proxy for institutional quality, in the effect of debt on growth. More precisely, our
findings show that there exists a critical level of democracy under which more public debt
leads to lower growth, ceteris paribus. While the focus of the existing literature has been on
whether there exist threshold effects of public debt on growth (tipping-points), this paper
suggests that, once a rich set of alternative theories are considered, there is very little evidence
for such nonlinearities. Instead, our findings suggest that the effect of public debt on growth
depends on a country’s democratic institutions. When a country’s institutions are below
a particular quality level, then, more public debt leads to lower growth (all else equal).
However, if a country’s institutions are of sufficiently high quality, then, public debt is
growth neutral. Our paper therefore shifts the focus of research on the long-run effects of
public debt towards the presence of parameter heterogeneity in the cross-country growth
process due to fundamental determinants of economic growth proposed by the new growth
theories.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical
methodology and Section 3 describes our data. In Section 4 we present the main results
of the paper and finally, in Section 5, we conclude.
2 Empirical methodology
2.1 The augmented Solow growth regression model
We start our investigation of the effect of debt, di, on economic growth using a Solow
growth model augmented with the debt-to-GDP ratio. This model assumes that the
structural growth process for country i obeys a linear model and is common across countries.
Specifically, we employ a three-period pooled panel to estimate a linear regression of the
average growth rate of real GDP per capita. Our analysis focuses on the coefficient of debt,
αd, which estimates the effect of debt on growth, controlling for a set of standard Solow
growth determinants, Si.
gi = β
′Xi + ei = α
′
SSi + αddi + ei, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (2.1)
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where Si is a vector of regressors that includes the Solow variables, namely the logarithm of
population growth plus 0.05 (Population Growth), the logarithm of the average investment
to GDP ratio (Investments), the logarithm of the average years of secondary and tertiary
schooling for male population over 25 years of age (Schooling), and the logarithm of real
GDP per worker in the initial year of each 10-year period (Initial Income). Si also includes
a constant and a time trend. eit is an i.i.d. error term. In this paper we instrument the
Solow variables using their lagged values.
Next, we describe a STR model for growth that deals with the problem of parameter
heterogeneity.
2.2 Threshold Solow growth model
We now describe the STR model by Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2013), that allows for
endogeneity in the slope regressors Xit as well as the threshold variable.
3 This model can
be viewed as a generalization of the simple threshold regression framework of Hansen (2000)
and Caner and Hansen (2004) to allow for the endogeneity of the threshold variable and
regime specific heteroskedasticity.
Consider a threshold variable qit such as public debt that can organize the observations
into regimes and define the following indicator function
I(qi ≤ γ) =
{
1 iff qi ≤ γ : Regime 1
0 iff qi > γ : Regime 2
(2.2)
and I(qi > γ) = 1 − I(qi ≤ γ). In this paper, we assume that qi can be any non-constant
variable that belongs to the set of determinants Xi. We assume that qi is endogenous so
that the reduced form equation that determines which regime applies takes the form
qi = π
′
qZi + vqi, (2.3)
It is worth noting that the above reduced form equation is analogous to the selection
3The threshold model of Caner and Hansen (2004) (IVTR) allows only for the endogeneity of the slope
regressors and maintains the assumption of the exogeneity of the threshold. STR reduces to IVTR when
κ = 0.
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equation that appears in the literature on limited dependent variable models. However, there
is one important difference. While in sample selection models, we observe the assignment of
observations into regimes but the (threshold) variable that drives this assignment is taken
to be latent, here, it is the opposite; we do not know which observations belong to which
regime (i.e., we do not know the threshold value), but we can observe the threshold variable.




′XiI(qi ≤ γ) + κλi(γ) + εi, (2.4)
where E(εi|Zi) = 0.
The term λi(γ) is a scalar variable that involves an inverse Mills ratio term for each
regime in order to restore the conditional mean zero property of the errors. In particular,
λit(γ) is defined as follows:



















. The functions φ(·) and Φ(·)
are the normal pdf and cdf, respectively.
Finally, note that the coefficients β are the coefficients of the second regime, that is
β = β2 and δ is the difference between the coefficients of regime 1, β1 and regime 2, β2; that
is, δ = β1 − β2. Equation (2.4) reduces to the linear growth model in equation (2.1) when
δ = κ = 0.
The estimation of the threshold parameter is based on a concentrated least squares
method while the slope coefficients are obtained using 2SLS or GMM. The asymptotic
distribution of the threshold parameter γ is nonstandard as it involves two independent
Brownian motions with two different scales and two different drifts. Confidence intervals are
provided by an inverted likelihood ratio approach; see Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2013).
Finally, we test the null hypothesis of a linear model against the alternative of a threshold
for each candidate threshold variable, H0 : δ = 0. We do so by employing the sup Wald
test of Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2013), which is an extension of the Davies (1977) Sup
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test to the GMM framework.4 Since the threshold parameter, γ, is not identified under the
null hypothesis of a linear model (i.e. no threshold effect), the p-values are computed by a
bootstrap method, which relies on the arguments of Hansen (1996). Specifically, the p-values
are computed by a bootstrap that fixes the regressors from the right-hand side of equation
(2.4) and generating the bootstrap dependent variable from the distribution N(0, ε̂2it), where
ε̂it is the demeaned residual from the estimated STR model.
3 Data
We employ a balanced 10-year period panel dataset covering 82 countries in 1980-89, 1990-
99, and 2000-2009. The three 10-year growth periods allow us to exploit the panel structure
of the data and at the same time average out business cycle effects. The dependent variable
is computed as the growth rate of real per capita GDP over the time interval sampled from
PWT 7.0.
We next describe the set of candidate threshold variables that we consider in addition
to the Solow variables and the debt-to-GDP ratio (Public Debt). We include (i) three policy
variables; i.e., a measure of trade Openness (the average ratio for each period of exports plus
imports to GDP), the log of the average inflation rate (plus one) for each period (Inflation),
and a measure of the size of Government relative to the economy (log of the average ratio for
each period of government consumption net of outlays on defense and education to GDP),
(ii) two measures of institutions; i.e., a measure of the extent of institutionalized Democracy
and a measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of
chief executives (Executive Constraints), and a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization
(Language), (iii) two geographic variables; i.e., the percentage of a country’s land area that
is classified as tropical or subtropical (Tropics) and the percentage of a country’s land area
within 100km of an ice-free coast (LCR100km), and, finally, (iv) two demographic variables;
i.e., the log of the average Life Expectancy and the log of the average total fertility rate
(Fertility) for each period.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the pooled data. The variables are drawn from
various sources. A detailed description of the variables and their sources is given in Table
4For robustness purposes we also employed the threshold sup test by Hansen (2000) that ignores the
issues of endogeneity and generally found similar results.
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A1 of the Appendix.
4 Results
We present results for our STR model with the Solow model augmented with public debt
as the regime-specific linear model as described in equation (2.4). Table 2 shows in the first
two columns the results of a test of the existence of a threshold effect against the null of
global linearity for each of the candidate threshold variables described in Section (3) above.
Of the 15 potential candidates, 9 cases; i.e., Initial Income, Schooling, Investments,
Population Growth, Fertility, Life Expectancy, Inflation, Tropics, and Democracy, resulted
in a rejection of the null. Significantly, there is very little evidence that Public Debt is a good
threshold variable for sample splitting. At least for this sample of countries, therefore, there
seems to be little evidence of nonlinearity in the effects of public debt on growth. However,
there is strong evidence of parameter heterogeneity as suggested by the significant threshold
effects obtained using several threshold variables other than the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Table 3 shows the estimate for the threshold value for each of the 9 threshold variables,
the associated 90% confidence interval for the threshold value, the number of observations
for each of the two regimes that come from splitting the sample according to each of these
threshold variables, and the associated J statistic for the STR model using each of these
threshold variables, respectively.
Each of these 9 threshold variables therefore constitutes a potential STR model for the
data. Hence, we need to select the model that best fits the data. We do so according to the
J criterion. As Table 3 shows, the J criterion is minimized when Democracy is the threshold
variable. Hence, we present our findings for the model that splits the sample into a Low-
Democracy regime (i.e., countries with Democracy scores below 4.5) and a High-Democracy
regime (i.e., countries with Democracy scores above 4.5) in Table 4. The threshold estimate
of 4.5 corresponds to Malaysia in period 2 and Nepal in period 3 and the lower and upper
bounds of the 90% confidence interval, [2.949, 4.799], correspond to Philippines in period 1
and Brazil in period 1, respectively. Table 5 shows the the exact sample of countries that
fall within each regime and for each period as well as the Democracy scores.
The findings from this STR model are quite striking and point to parameter
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heterogeneity in the sense that the effect of debt on growth depends on democracy. All
else equal, higher public debt results in lower growth for countries in the Low-Democracy
regime. The coefficient to public debt for this regime is negative and strongly significant at
the 1% level. However, for countries with better quality institutions; i.e., countries in the
High-Democracy regime, public debt has no significant effect on growth. We should also note
that countries in the Low-Democracy regime tend to have, on average, higher public debt
levels than those in the High-Democracy countries. The mean public debt level for countries
in the Low-Democracy regime is around 0.8. In this sense, our results reflect those in the
existing literature that suggest that more highly indebted countries are also the ones that
tend to experience more negative growth effects from higher levels of debt. However, our
findings highlight that the threshold effects that are important in determining the effect of
debt on growth are governed by institutions rather than the level of debt itself. Interestingly,
the Low-Democracy regime is also characterized by lower growth and income compared to
the High-Democracy regime.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to an important contemporary debate on the relationship between
public debt and long-run economic performance. The focus of the existing literature has
been on whether there exist nonlinear effects of public debt on growth. Is there a critical
level of public debt such that over it, more public debt leads to lower growth, all else
equal? The findings in this paper suggest that, once a rich set of alternative theories are
considered, there is very little evidence for such nonlinearities. Instead, our findings suggest
that the relationship between public debt and growth is mitigated crucially by the quality
of a country’s institutions. When a country’s institutions are below a particular quality
level, then, more public debt leads to lower growth (all else equal). However, if a country’s
institutions are of sufficiently high quality, then, public debt is growth neutral. Our paper
therefore shifts the focus of research on the long-run effects of “high levels” of public debt
towards its interplay with the deep (fundamental) determinant of growth as recently proposed
by the new growth theories.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for our dataset.
Mean Std Dev Max Min
Growth 0.013737 0.02296 0.083383 -0.09946
Initial Income 8.423263 1.266566 10.71059 5.868249
Lag of Initial Income 8.335907 1.232224 10.54767 5.779916
Schooling 0.598071 0.768791 1.970172 -2.18351
L ag of schooling 0.320655 0.901583 1.901029 -2.66267
Investments 3.046038 0.351779 3.891546 1.87323
Lag of Investments 3.055552 0.394586 4.312729 1.743324
Population Growth -2.71142 0.160957 -2.38471 -3.2289
Lag of Population Growth -2.69098 0.16542 -2.27681 -3.08358
Fertility 1.165151 0.501702 2.051261 0.188966
Lag of fertility 1.27774 0.521549 2.057247 0.153579
Life Expectancy 4.152884 0.176415 4.395388 3.656394
Lag of Life Expectancy 4.129947 0.179433 4.376214 3.614339
Public Debt 0.725291 0.626556 5.59726 0.087895
Lag of Public debt 0.660963 0.609409 6.405994 0.030556
Government 2.195023 0.439004 3.560925 1.056177
Lag of Government 2.192095 0.477742 3.694487 1.014359
Inflation 2.298081 1.167341 7.571372 -1.95183
Lag of Inflation 2.33869 1.193889 8.258299 -1.45953
Openness 66.51136 36.48778 199.8575 9.768346
Lag of openness 61.00657 35.80411 180.0895 9.697868
Democracy 5.742649 3.834012 10 0
Lag of Democracy 5.021545 4.167344 10 0
Executive Constraints 4.958977 2.047979 7 1
Lag of Executive Constraints 4.512398 2.332962 7 1
LCR100km 0.458926 0.361177 1 0
Tropics 0.428233 0.425988 1 0
Language 0.38244 0.297867 0.898015 0.002113
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Table 2: Threshold tests
This table presents sup Wald tests for the null hypothesis that the linear Solow growth model augmented by the debt-gdp-ratio in equation
(2.1) against the alternative hypothesis of the threshold model in equation (2.4). ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. All models include constant and trend.
Threshold Variable sup Wald Boot p-value
Initial Income 53.575* 0.057
Schooling 43.1849*** 0.002
Investments 30.1235* 0.067
Population growth 57.804** 0.015
Fertility 51.9421** 0.037
Life expectancy 81.4932*** 0.000










Table 3: Threshold tests
This table shows the point estimate of the threshold parameter along with the associated the 90% confidence interval, the sample size of two
growth regimes, and the J statistic for the STR models that rejected the null of the linear model in Table 2.
Threshold Variable threshold estimate 90% Confidence Interval nlow nHigh J statistic
Initial Income 6.93585 [ 6.9258, 7.4708 ] 36 210 2.3E-21
Schooling 0.95985 [ 0.4689, 1.3219 ] 163 83 6.39E-21
Investments 2.729622 [ 2.7296, 2.7476 ] 35 211 5.89E-22
Population growth -2.87913 [-2.9211,-2.5471] 54 192 1.17E-18
Fertility 1.067608 [0.8776, 1.2866 ] 109 137 1.7E-19
Life expectancy 3.97159 [ 3.9706, 3.9716 ] 43 203 9.52E-22
Inflation 2.776564 [ 1.7656, 2.8246 ] 192 54 3.38E-21
Democracy 4.599 [ 2.949, 4.799 ] 90 156 1.58E-22
Tropics 0.443 [ 0, 0.967 ] 129 117 9.57E-21
12
Table 4: STR estimation
This table presents the estimation of the STR model of Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2013) using Democracy as a threshold variable. All
variables are instrumented using their lagged values. It also presents the TR model of Hansen (2000) that ignores endogeneity. The last two
columns report the GMM and LS results for the global estimation that ignores the presence of a threshold. The means of the variables are
also reported for each regime. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Method STR-GMM TR-LS Linear-GMM Linear-LS
Threshold Estimate 4.500 4.600
90% Confidence Interval [2.949, 4.799] [ 1.2, 5.6 ]
J statistic 1.577E-22
Low High Low High
Initial Income 0.0023 -0.0147*** 0.0013 -0.0118*** -0.0047** -0.0032*
(0.0052) (0.0031) (0.0047) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0019)
Schooling 0.0056 0.0083* 0.0047 0.0099*** 0.0056* 0.0062**
(0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0029)
Investments 0.0060 -0.0042 0.0173*** 0.0116* 0.0061 0.0187***
(0.0069) (0.0103) (0.0057) (0.0064) (0.0051) (0.0039)
Population growth -0.0132 -0.0811*** 0.0283 -0.0630*** -0.0554*** -0.0197*
(0.0514) (0.0237) (0.0341) (0.0144) (0.0164) (0.0109)
Public debt -0.0109*** 0.0040 -0.0121*** -0.0028 -0.0004 -0.0071***
(0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0022)
Const -0.0571 -0.0680 0.0200 -0.0928** -0.1227*** -0.0738***
(0.1110) (0.0490) (0.0638) (0.0363) (0.0383) (0.0282)
Trend -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0040 0.0003 0.0020 0.0028
(0.0040) (0.0017) (0.0033) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0018)
IMR-kappa -0.0063***
(0.0017)
Number of obs 90 156 91 155
Means
Growth 0.0052 0.0187 0.0050 0.0189
Public debt 0.8288 0.6656 0.8270 0.6656
Initial Income 7.5315 8.9378 7.5454 8.9387
Schooling 0.1268 0.8700 0.1314 0.8721
Investments 2.9927 3.0768 2.9906 3.0786
Population growth -2.6149 -2.7671 -2.6178 -2.7664
Democracy 1.1737 8.3786 1.2114 8.4030
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Table 5: Low- and High-Democracy regimes
This table presents the countries marked as Low-Democracy countries (L) (i.e. countries with democracy scores less than or equal to 4.5) and High-Democracy countries (H) (i.e. countries
with democracy scores greater than 4.5) for each period.
1980-89 1990-99 2000-09 1980-89 1990-99 2000-09
Europe Latin America and the Caribbean
Austria (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Argentina (H) 5.5 (H) 7.1 (H) 8
Belgium (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 9.4 Bolivia (H) 6.9 (H) 9 (H) 8.2
Denmark (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Brazil (H) 4.7 (H) 8 (H) 8
Finland (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Chile (L) 1 (H) 8 (H) 9.4
France (H) 8.4 (H) 9 (H) 9 Colombia (H) 8 (H) 7.9 (H) 7
Greece (H) 8.8 (H) 10 (H) 10 Costa Rica (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10
Ireland (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Dominican Republic (H) 6 (H) 6.6 (H) 8
Italy (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Ecuador (H) 8.6 (H) 8.9 (H) 5.8
Netherlands (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Guatemala (L) 2 (H) 5.6 (H) 8
Norway (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Guyana (L) 0 (H) 4.8 (H) 6
Portugal (H) 9.8 (H) 10 (H) 10 Honduras (H) 5.6 (H) 6.1 (H) 7
Spain (H) 9.8 (H) 10 (H) 10 Jamaica (H) 10 (H) 9.3 (H) 9
Sweden (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Mexico (L) 1.2 (L) 3.8 (H) 8
United Kingdom (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Nicaragua (L) 0.625 (H) 7 (H) 8.3
Panama (L) 0.8 (H) 8.6 (H) 9
Offshoots Paraguay (L) 0.3 (H) 6.1 (H) 7.9
Australia (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Peru (H) 7 (L) 3.9 (H) 9
Canada (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Trinidad &Tobago (H) 8.6 (H) 9.3 (H) 10
New Zealand (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Uruguay (H) 4.6 (H) 10 (H) 10
United States (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Venezuela (H) 9 (H) 8.1 (H) 5.3
East Asia and the Pacific Sub-Saharan Africa
Indonesia (L) 0 (L) 0.7 (H) 7.6 Benin (L) 0 (H) 6 (H) 6.4
Japan (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Botswana (H) 6.3 (H) 7.3 (H) 8
Korea Republic of (L) 1.75 (H) 7.2 (H) 8 Burundi (L) 0 (L) 0.25 (L) 4
Malaysia (H) 5 (L) 4.5 (L) 4.4 Cameroon (L) 0 (L) 0.8 (L) 1
Papua New Guinea (L) 4 (L) 4 (L) 4 Central African Republic (L) 0 (L) 3.5 (L) 2.2
Philippines (L) 3 (H) 8 (H) 8 Congo Republic of (L) 0 (L) 3.45 (L) 0
Thailand (L) 3.2 (H) 7.7 (H) 6.6 Cote d‘Ivoire (L) 0 (L) 0 (H) 5
Gabon (L) 0 (L) 0 (L) 0.4
Europe and Central Asia Gambia The (H) 7.1 (L) 3.2 (L) 0
Turkey (H) 5.7 (H) 8.7 (H) 8 Ghana (L) 0.6 (L) 1.675 (H) 7.2
Kenya (L) 0 (L) 0.6 (H) 6.5
Middle East and North Africa Lesotho (L) 0 (H) 5.6 (H) 8
Algeria (L) 0.1 (L) 0.7 (L) 2.2 Malawi (L) 0 (L) 3.6 (H) 5.9
Cyprus (H) 10 (H) 10 (H) 10 Mali (L) 0 (H) 5.825 (H) 6.8
Egypt (L) 0 (L) 0 (L) 0.5 Mauritania (L) 0 (L) 0 (L) 0.4
Iran (L) 0 (L) 1.2 (L) 1.6 Niger (L) 0 (L) 4.4 (H) 5.9
Israel (H) 9 (H) 9.1 (H) 10 Senegal (L) 2 (L) 2 (H) 7.7
Morocco (L) 0 (L) 0 (L) 0 Sierra Leone (L) 0 (L) 1.25 (H) 5.9
Syria (L) 0 (L) 0 (L) 0 South Africa (H) 7 (H) 8.33 (H) 9
Tunisia (L) 0 (L) 0.7 (L) 1 Swaziland (L) 0 (L) 0 (L) 0
Togo (L) 0 (L) 0.83 (L) 1
South Asia Zambia (L) 0 (L) 4.2 (H) 5.2
Bangladesh (L) 0 (H) 5.4 (H) 4.8 Zimbabwe (L) 2.7 (L) 0.1 (L) 1.2
India (H) 8 (H) 8.5 (H) 9
Nepal (L) 1.8 (H) 5.2 (L) 4.5
Pakistan (L) 1.6 (H) 7 (L) 1.2
Sri Lanka (H) 6 (H) 6 (H) 6.6
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Table A1: Data Appendix
Variable Description
Time trend Time trend variable for the periods 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009.
Growth Growth rate of real per capita GDP in chain series for the periods 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009.
Source: PWT 7.0.
Initial Income Logarithm of real per capita GDP in chain series at 1980, 1990, 2000. Lagged values correspond
to 1975, 1985 and 1995. Source: PWT 7.0.
Population Growth Rates Logarithm of average population growth rates plus 0.05 for the periods 1980-89, 1990-99 and
2000-2009. Lagged values correspond to 1975-79, 1985-89 and 1995-1999. Source: PWT 7.0.
Investment Logarithm of average ratios over each period of investment to real GDP per capita for the periods
1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009. Lagged values correspond to 1975-79, 1985-89 and 1995-1999.
Source: PWT 7.0.
Schooling Logarithm of average years of male secondary and tetriary school attainment (25+) in 1980, 1990,
and 1999. Lagged values correspond to 1975, 1985 and 1995. Source: Barro and Lee (2000).
Debt Public debt to GDP for the periods 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009. Lagged values correspond to
1975-79, 1985-89 and 1995-1999. Source: IMF, Debt Database Fall 2011 Vintage
Government Logarithm of average ratios for each period of government consumption to real GDP per capita for
the periods 1975-79, 1985-89 and 1995-1999 and 2000-2009. Lagged values correspond to 1975-79,
1985-89 and 1995-1999. Source: PWT 7.0
Inflation Logarithm of average inflation plus 1 for the periods 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009. Lagged
values correspond to 1975-79, 1985-89 and 1995-1999. Source: Worldbank
Openness Average ratios for each period of exports plus imports to real GDP per capita for the periods
1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009. Lagged values correspond to 1975-79, 1985-89 and 1995-1999.
Source: PWT 7.0.
Life Expectancy Log of average life expectancy at birth for the periods 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009. Lagged
values correspond to 1975-79, 1985-89 and 1995-1999. Source: World Bank
Fertility Logarithm of the average total fertility rate (births per woman) in 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009.




Executive Constraints A measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief
executives. This variable ranges from one to seven where higher values equal a greater extent of
institutionalized constraints on the power of chief executives. This variable is calculated as the
average for the periods 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009. Lagged values correspond to 1975-79,
1985-89 and 1995-1999. Source: Polity IV
Democracy A measure of the extent of institutionalized democracy, presence of institutions and procedures,
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive, and guarantee
of civil liberties to all citizens. This variable ranges from one to ten where higher values equal a
greater extent of institutionalized democracy. This variable is calculated as the average for the
periods 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99 and 2000-2009. Lagged values correspond to 1975-79, 1985-89
and 1995-1999. Source: Polity IV
Language Measure of linguistic fractionalization based on data describing shares of languages spoken as
mother tongues. Source: Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg
(2003).
Tropics Percentage of land area classified as tropical and subtropical via the in Koeppen-Geiger system.
Source: The Center for International Development at Harvard University
LCR100km Percentage of a country’s land area within 100km of an ice- free coast. Source: The Center for
International Development at Harvard University
Eastern Religion Eastern Religion share in 1970 and 2000 expressed as a fraction of the population. It includes
Chinese Universists, Confucians, Neoreligionists, Shintos, and Zoroastrians (Parsis). Source: World
Christian Encyclopedia
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